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EVIDENTIARY RULES AND RULINGS:
THE ROLE OF TREATISES
Richard D. Friedman*
I have devoted large gobs of time to work on a multi-author treatise
on the law of evidence.' And before even one volume is published, I will
devote further multiple gobs of time to the project-which, perhaps audaciously and perhaps merely foolishly, but with heredity and precedent
on our side,2 we are calling The New Wigmore. Accordingly, I found the
question posed by this symposium-Does Evidence Law Matter?rather disquieting. If it is doubtful even whether the law of evidence
matters, then how much can a treatise on the law of evidence matter, and
how worthwhile can such a work be? Luckily (but not surprisingly, I
suppose, for I have considerable sunk cost), I have resolved my fears.
Yes, I believe that evidentiary law does matter, at least some of the time.
What is more, an evidentiary treatise might make a difference even when
in some sense the law does not.
In some cases, evidence law matters because it affects conduct or
attitudes, or protects values, outside the courtroom. It seems reasonable
to believe, for example, that sometimes a potential defendant's willingness to make a settlement offer depends on her having confidence that the
fact of the offer will not come back to haunt her in some proceedingwhether or not against the potential plaintiff-as evidence of her own
belief that she was liable.3 In some circumstances, a client is more likely
to communicate with his lawyer if he is confident that privilege will bar
the lawyer from revealing the substance of the communication. The rape
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; B.A., 1973, Harvard College;
J.D., 1976, Harvard University Law School. Many thanks to David Leonard.
1. I am General Editor of the treatise and will be author of the volumes on the law of
hearsay.
2. Heredity because the treatise is to be published by Little, Brown and Company, publisher of all four editions of the Wigmore treatise, as the successor to that treatise. Precedent
because a similar locution has been used for other large successor works. See THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987), the modem successor
to a famous 19th century economics encyclopedia, and THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF
MUSIC AND MUSICIANS (Stanley Sadie ed., 1980), a 20-volume standard work.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (limiting admissibility of settlement offers and statements made
in settlement negotiations).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:885

shield laws4 not only keep out evidence of great potential prejudice and

dubious probative value,5 but also protect the privacy of complaining
witnesses, limit the possibility of a renewed trauma, remove a potentially

large obstruction to the reporting and prosecution of rape and may also
help alter deep-seated social attitudes.'

Most commonly, though, evidence law matters because it may determine what evidence is presented to the fact finder. And sometimes
that is crucial to the case. For example, a jury that has enough doubt in

a criminal case to acquit might come out the other way if it hears evidence that the accused committed a similar crime on another occasion. 7
Thus, an evidentiary ruling-a decision whether or not to allow a given
piece of evidence to be considered by the fact finder-may be outcomedeterminative.

But a ruling is not the same thing as a rule. By an evidentiary rule,
I mean an articulation applicable to a general class of situations that
prescribes what the evidentiary ruling should be, or at least what considerations should determine the ruling. Though evidentiary rulings may

determine the outcomes of cases and some consequences outside the
courtroom, it is another question whether evidentiary rules determine
rulings. My answer is hardly surprising: they do, more or less, depending on the circumstances.
4. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (limiting admissibility, in sex offense cases, of evidence of past
sexual behavior of alleged victim).
5. I do not mean to suggest that all evidence of prior sexual conduct of the complaining
witness ought to be excluded. Note that Federal Rule of Evidence 412 articulates certain
circumstances in which the evidence is admissible, and recognizes that in some other circumstances admissibility of the evidence may be constitutionally required. FED. R. EVID. 412,
For a thoughtful consideration of the circumstances in which such evidence ought to be admitted, see Harriett R. Galvin, ShieldingRape Victims in the State and FederalCourts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. Rlv. 763 (1986).
6. For an excellent exposition of the policies underlying the rape shield statutes, see Galvin, supra note 5 at 791-801.
7. Here is one piece of anecdotal evidence. Several years ago, I sat in on part of a rape
trial. The defendant, Dennis (the names are made up), admitted having had sex with the
complainant, Carol, who was the roommate of his then girlfriend, Gail. Dennis contended,
however, that the sex was consensual. There was some evidence tending to make Dennis's
account plausible and so to introduce doubt into the prosecution's case. For example, Gail's
testimony concerning her reaction on hearing from Carol of the encounter was that she felt
betrayed by Dennis's infidelity and did not suggest that she felt outraged by a criminal act; the
defense also presented a plausible account of why Carol, who did not report the incident to the
police for some time, might then have fabricated a charge. I was not surprised that the jury
voted to acquit Dennis on the evidence I heard; I too thought that the prosecution had not
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. My perception, though, was altered considerably
when I learned one piece of information that had been excluded from evidence: Tina, the
girlfriend of Dennis's roommate, also alleged that he had raped her. I strongly suspect that the
jury also would have come out differently had it learned of this evidence.
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Sometimes a rule is stated with a hard enough edge, and the case
falls sufficiently close to the core of the rule's concern, so that a conscientious judge will have little choice but to apply the rule. Often, for example, it is clear beyond serious debate that a similar crime previously
committed by the accused has no substantial probative value in the current case other than to prove his propensity to commit crimes of this
sort. And, as offered for this purpose, the evidence should clearly be
excluded, in a jurisdiction adhering to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
under Rule 404(b).8 Moreover, even if the judge does not adhere to the
rule, an appellate court is likely to monitor it carefully; the issue is easy
to spot, and, given the bright-line nature of the rule, the violation may be
as well. The appellate court will also have reason for concern because a
violation may well have significant consequences, given that the evidence
has great persuasive power, and that the power is exercised in a prejudicial manner 9 against a criminal defendant.10
On the other hand, sometimes articulation of an evidentiary rule,
either by codifiers or by courts, is very fuzzy. This is true most obviously
of Rule 403, which allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if the
probative value of the evidence is "substantially outweighed" by any or a
combination of considerations, including "unfair prejudice" and "undue
delay." 11 But the trial court's discretion is not limited to this general
rule; discretion is imbedded in most of the more particular rules of evi8. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith."
The Rule does not interfere with the admissibility of such evidence when it is offered "for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident." Id. It is not always clear whether the evidence truly has
enough probative value with respect to one of these factors to warrant admissibility notwithstanding the likelihood that the jury will improperly consider the evidence on a propensity
theory. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984).

9. That is, a jury would often be correct in regarding propensity evidence as tending to
make the accused's guilt more likely, but given the policy judgment that a verdict of guilt
depending on a propensity theory is unacceptable, the more persuasive the propensity evidence
is the more prejudicial it should be deemed.
10. This concern is not peculiar to Rule 404(b) and its kin; rather, special solicitude for the
criminal defendant is a recurrent theme of the law. Largely because a wrongful conviction is
so dreaded, due process has been deemed to require a presumption of innocence and the imposition on the prosecution of a burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). Other principles, either protecting only current or potential criminal defendants, see U.S. CONST. amend. V (granting defendant right not to be a witness
against self), or, like the exclusionary aspect of Rule 404(b), having their most important effect
in favor of criminal defendants, see FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (general exclusion of character evidence to show action in conformity with character trait); FED. R. EVID. 609 (limiting admissibility of prior crimes in impeaching credibility of witness), exclude evidence that is, or might
be thought to be, highly probative.
11. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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dence as well. Consider, for example, the language of Rule 702 gov-

erning expert testimony-whether "specialized knowledge will assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. "12
The residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
13
quite obviously leave the trial court a great deal of room to maneuver.
But so too do most of the particular exceptions; for example, for a statement to be considered an excited utterance within the meaning of rules
such as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), how much must the stress of a
startling event have limited the ability of the declarant to engage in reflective thought before making the statement?14
Often a case lies sufficiently close to a fuzzy evidentiary line that
even a conscientious judge trying hard to adhere to the rule is pretty
much free to do whatever she would have done if the rule did not exist at

all. Moreover, even if an appellate court concludes that the judge either
admitted or excluded evidence incorrectly, it will often be reluctant, especially in civil cases, to reverse the judgment on that basis."
Lawyers and judges often need guidance in applying the law of evidence. One of the functions that a treatise may serve is to set out the

rules, whether codified or not, and to show how they apply in various
significant situations. This is certainly a function that lawyers and judges

find valuable, for many keep close at hand a treatise on the law of evidence in their jurisdiction. And this function is a valid and important
12. FED. R. EvID. 702.

13. One of the critical factors in applying the residual exceptions is whether the evidence
in question has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," in comparison to
the other exceptions listed in Rules 803 and 804, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5), respectively-a
mystifying standard, given the long lists of very dissimilar exceptions in those rules. Another
consideration is whether "the general purposes of [the] rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
14. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) excepts from the rule against hearsay "[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition." Courts have varied in their application of the excited utterance exception:
Although one court has held a statement made fourteen hours after a physical beating to be the product of the excitement caused by the beating, other courts have held
statements made within minutes of the event not admissible. Perhaps an accurate
rule of thumb might be that where the time interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in
the absence of some proof that the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective
thought process.
CLEARY, supra note 8, § 297 (citations omitted); see also People v. Nevitt, 553 N.E.2d 368,
375-77 (Ill. 1990) (upholding under excited utterance exception admission of statement made
five hours after alleged incident of sexual abuse).
15. In the federal system, evidentiary error should not be the basis for reversal unless it
"affect[s] substantial rights of the parties within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2111." United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 516 (1954).
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one as well, for clarity is all to the good. I do not believe that uniformity
in evidentiary decision-making is usually crucial-trial judges differ
widely in how they treat evidentiary issues, and the differences are usually tolerable-but it is important that judges and lawyers at least understand the rules. Moreover, if the rule is optimal, then it is best that the
ruling it prescribes (to the extent that it prescribes one) be followed.
There are two important qualifiers in the last sentence, and these
suggest two other functions that a treatise may serve, functions that to
my mind are more interesting than clarification and exposition. First,
not all rules of evidence are optimal. A treatise can make a difference by
suggesting how evidence law might be improved. Second, a treatise can
offer guidance for those many cases in which the rules do not prescribe a
ruling. I will focus on each of these fumctions in turn.
Most courts in day to day practice are not inclined to attempt
broad-based revisions of evidentiary rules. Codifiers might, but even codification can be a largely conservative exercise-articulating, clarifying
and neatening the law without seriously examining its underlying principles. 6 Courts and codifiers might institute broad changes, but they are
unlikely to initiate them. That is a job primarily, or at least largely, for
scholars, the more so the broader the change is. A law review article, the
most common means of legal academic discourse, might present a broadbased proposal, but a treatise offers a better forum for doing so.
By undertaking the task of contributing to a treatise on evidentiary
law, a writer commits to exploration with both the microscope and the
telescope. The writer must examine a broad segment of the law, and do
so in depth, thinking about it not only on the grand scale but also in its
application to a myriad of situations that might arise. The detail work
will tend to confront the writer with all the significant consequences of
the rule, both within the courtroom and beyond-its impact on truth
determination at trial, on the litigation process, and on conduct, values
and attitudes intrinsic and extrinsic to the litigation. And so he will naturally be led to examine the precepts, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the
litigation system, underlying the evidentiary rule, and to consider how
the rule might be transformed. He must then test the replacement rule
16. The Federal Rules' approach to hearsay provides an example:
The approach to hearsay in these rules is that of the common law, i.e., a general rule
excluding hearsay, with exceptions under which evidence is not required to be excluded even though hearsay. The traditional hearsay exceptions are drawn upon for
the exceptions .... This plan is submitted as calculated to encourage growth and
development in this area of the law, while conserving the values and experience of the
past as a guide to the future.
FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note.
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against a similar set of situations, precepts and potential consequences.

Thus, the need to do microscopic work encourages, and improves the
quality of, the writer's telescopic work.

That the treatise writer reconceptualizes a portion of the law of evidence does not, of course, mean that anyone will listen. But there is a
chance that they will. At least the treatise, if it is well done, becomes one
of the primary sources that judges and lawyers facing difficult evidentiary
problems tend to consult, even if they are searching more for narrow

analysis than for broad conceptualization. And that means that the treatise offers a bully pulpit, far better than most law review articles. Thus,

Wigmore's treatise had enormous impact on the development of the law
of evidence.1 7 Latter day treatise writers cannot-and should not-hope
to dominate the field as Wigmore did." But if there is to be a broadbased rethinking of the law of evidence, the treatise form maximizes the
writer's chance to make a significant contribution. 19

Day to day, though, a treatise may make a contribution more mundane than transformation of the law, or even of a particular rule, and yet
more creative than mere clarification and exposition of the rules. As I
have argued above, often the rules leave a judge with ample room to
17. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 21 (3d ed. 1991)
("Wigmore's influence cannot be overstated; his work has remained the dominant authority in
the field to this day. Perhaps this treatise was in part responsible for the fact that codification
did not begin to take hold until the 1970's.").
18. As late as 1940, Edmund Morgan echoed John Maguire's words, "Wigmore is still
first, and there is no second." Edmund M. Morgan, Book Review, 20 B.U. L. REV. 776, 777
(1940) (reviewing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940)) (quoting JOHN M. MAGUIRE,
Book Review, 22 ILL. L. REv. 688, 692 (1928)). Such a statement does not set an appropriate
level of aspiration; rather it makes a (perhaps unjustifiably) sad comment of the evidence scholarship of that time.
19. Consider, for example, Wigmore's pathbreaking work in rationalizing the exceptions
to the rule against hearsay. Wigmore perceived the exceptions as being justified by "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and concerns of "necessity." 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1420-22 (1904). To a large extent, these considerations still, according to the received wisdom, provide the rationale for the hearsay exceptions.
See FED R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (residual exceptions requiring, inter alia, "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those for enumerated exceptions, and proof that
"the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts"); FED. R. EViD. 803 advisory
committee's note ("[u]nder appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant
....
"); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee's note (hearsay that is of lesser quality but
still "meets a specified standard" may be admitted if declarant is unavailable). Incidently, I

believe that Wigmore's rationalization is no longer adequate. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a PartialEconomic, Game Theoretic,Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
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maneuver to make the ruling that she thinks is optimal in the particular
situation; it is here that, at least in a sense, evidence law may not matter
very much. I think that this is good, or at least that it is better than any
feasible alternative. Rule-makers, whether codifiers or courts, cannot
hope to anticipate in advance all the situations that might arise and the
precise ruling, or even considerations, that should govern. And if they
did try to be too prescriptive, the rules too often would lead to rulings
that poorly fit the situation at hand. But to the extent that the rules are
open, the trial judge is left free to roam. My concern, again, is not so
much that judges' rulings will lack uniformity, though that is sometimes
of importance, but that the rulings will not be soundly based and reasoned. A busy trial judge cannot ordinarily expect to reach consistently
sound results by working out each difficult evidentiary problem from basic principles.
Or at least she cannot expect to do so without help. A treatise cannot totally bridge, but it can narrow, the gap between rule and ruling,
between the functions of codifier or appellate court and trial court. No, a
treatise cannot anticipate all the situations in which a rule may come into
play. But it can anticipate far more broadly than can an evidentiary code
or an appellate opinion. And it can analyze in depth those important
situations that it does anticipate.2 0 In most situations, that analysis,
however persuasive, will not relieve the trial judge of all responsibility,
for she will still have to address the facts of the particular case. But the
treatise writer, by offering a reasoned discussion, and one grounded in
underlying principles, can vastly ease the trial judge's burden and improve the quality of her rulings. In this case, the treatise writer's telescopic work facilitates his microscopic work.
By now perhaps it is clear what kind of treatise I hope The New
Wigmore will be. Although the treatise may help readers find out what
the law is, that will only be an incidental function. There are already
many very helpful research tools for finding the law: codifications such
as the Federal Rules of Evidence, where they govern, are usually clearly
structured and provide a helpful means of access to case law; computer20. Suppose, for example, a judge or lawyer is considering the question of whether a particular factual statement made in the proof of loss accompanying an insurance claim should be
deemed a party admission when offered against the claimant. The governing evidentiary code,
if there is one, probably sheds little light on the matter. There may not be any reasonably
recent law review article on the topic (I know of none). Opinions dealing with similar questions may be found, but they may appear to be in conflict and, particularly if they focus tightly
on the facts of the cases there presented, may not offer much guidance for the case at hand. A
treatise may cover the issue in broad enough terms to place it in context, and in precise enough
terms to be of real assistance.
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ized services can instantly gather the cases bearing on certain problems;
useful handbooks explain the law of evidence in many jurisdictions; excellent syntheses, like McCormick on Evidence, and even longer treatises,
such as Weinstein and Berger's or Louisell and Mueller's, explain evidentiary law in general or under the Federal Rules.
What I do hope is that The New Wigmore becomes, as its predecessor certainly was, one of the first sources that anyone-judge, practitioner, academic or non-lawyer-naturally consults when seeking a
reflective discussion of a difficult evidentiary question. To reach this status, a treatise must achieve a comprehensiveness that is beyond the scope
of even most multi-author treatises-comprehensive not only in the
scope of evidentiary questions covered but also in the depth of attention
paid to each area and in the extent to which underlying conceptual issues
are addressed. Such a treatise must examine and challenge the basic
precepts and organizing principles of evidentiary law, paying careful attention to the procedural context and consequences of evidentiary questions and to the light that may be shed on those questions by knowledge
gained from outside the law. From this intellectual base, a treatise can
ask how a wise set of precepts and principles should apply, through the
operation of particular rules, in a broad range of situations. The Wright,
Graham & Gold treatise now in progress achieves this type of comprehensiveness. But the market for contributions of this sort is not anywhere near saturation, and realistically probably never could be.
How useful, and how enduring, a contribution we make will in the
end determine whether we had any justification, apart from history and
precedent, for using the name Wigmore on the spine.

